

Canadian NGO Sudan Issues Brief

11 July 2006

Summary: This brief reflects key issues identified by Canadian NGOs for both immediate and longer-term action in Sudan. It provides a set of recommendations focused on protecting people from violence, providing adequate and timely humanitarian assistance, ending impunity, supporting peace processes, and long-term peacebuilding and development.

Protection of people: The ongoing civilian protection crisis in Sudan's Darfur region demands urgent action on the part of Canada, the government of Sudan and the international community to ensure adequate security for hundreds of thousands of people at risk. At the same time, the humanitarian crisis in Eastern Sudan, another locus of rebellion in Sudan, must not be ignored. Restrictions on aid groups in the East are even more severe than those in Darfur. Intervention is necessary now to prevent the situation from escalating to the level of that in the Darfur region, and requires immediate humanitarian aid, as well as long-term development assistance and support for a negotiated settlement of longstanding grievances. In the South, slowness in implementing the military restructuring and other provisions of the North-South peace agreement are also increasing insecurity for civilians and are cause for grave concern. Canada's engagement in Sudan can make a difference in providing life-saving humanitarian assistance by increasing support for protection of civilians and in support of peaceful negotiations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Canada support the efforts of Canadian, international, and Sudanese non-governmental organizations and human rights defenders by:
 - Applying concerted diplomatic pressure on the government of Sudan to afford full protection to humanitarian efforts and humanitarian space in Sudan;
 - Pressuring the government of Sudan to amend or repeal the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act, 2006;
 - Continuing to provide financial and diplomatic support for humanitarian aid organizations and their work for the provision of food, water, sanitation and health services in all regions of Sudan. Key to this is making funding more predictable to limit disruption to, and ensure continuity of, humanitarian and civil society work.
2. That Canada commit to supporting a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur with adequate resources and a comprehensive mandate for the protection of civilians.
3. During the period of transition to a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur, that Canada provide financial and technical support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), with a focus on putting more troops on the ground, strengthening AMIS' mandate to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and providing:
 - Increased physical security in camps for the displaced through constant security patrols with procedures in place to prevent sexual and other violence;
 - Security for civilians moving outside the camps;
 - Regular road patrols.
4. In addition to protection against attacks by the Janjaweed, immediate pressure to ensure the protection of civilians and aid workers must also be applied on rebel factions in the conflict, who are increasingly adopting tactics that harm civilians. Both the Janjaweed and rebel groups must be disarmed to ensure security in the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. That Canada work to put an end to impunity in the short- and longer-term by:

- Adopting, along with other states, measures such as targeted sanctions to ensure full government of Sudan cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and ensuring that those named by the UN for crimes against humanity, including sexual and gender-based violence and the use of rape as a weapon of war, are brought to justice;
- Applying diplomatic pressure to stop proposed legislation which would give security forces and police the right to shoot to kill without being held accountable;
- Using the RCMP's police training capacity to strengthen Sudan's professional police services, making them representative of and responsive and accountable to society as a whole;
- Assisting in the reform and ongoing strengthening of Sudanese judicial and security systems, including the training of lawyers and the reforming of prisons, so that they operate in a manner consistent with internationally-accepted standards.

An End to Impunity: Immediate priority should be given to increasing efforts to end impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the systematic use of rape and other sexual violence as a weapon of war. Proposed legislation to grant Sudanese police and other security forces shoot-to-kill discretion and immunity from prosecution poses a severe threat to civilians throughout the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. That Canada take a lead in extending the ambit of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) to:

- Ensure that marginalized groups and factions not included in the agreement are included in further negotiations and amendments;
- Continue supporting women's involvement in peace negotiations and the implementation of the agreement;
- Support the establishment of an international monitoring mechanism for implementation of the DPA;
- Provide financial and technical support for implementation;
- Strengthen the potency and equity of the agreement by encouraging reforms, including:
 - Specifics and timelines for disarming the Janjaweed militia and rebel groups that can be monitored by the international community;
 - Providing for more adequate personal compensation for victims of violence and displaced persons;
 - Establishment of effective mechanisms for settling disputes of land ownership.

7. Continued pressure must be put on the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement to live up to their commitments and to continue to work together to implement the agreement. In particular, both sides must stop recruiting, maintaining and inciting militias. Also, the National

Support for Peace Processes: Also key is sustained and effective support for extending the Darfur peace process, for energizing implementation of the North-South peace agreement, as well as negotiations affecting Eastern Sudan.

Congress Party, the dominant party in the government of Sudan, must be pressured to implement the recommendations of the Abyei Boundaries Commission, as required by the CPA.

8. Canada must support the peace negotiations with Eastern Sudan now underway in Eritrea. Canada must be vigilant in monitoring these negotiations to ensure they address the very real concerns of the people of East Sudan and are not merely a vehicle for reconciling the interests of the governments of Sudan and Eritrea. It is particularly important that marginalized groups, including women, are present and participate in peace negotiations and agreements.

Peacebuilding: Canada cannot lose sight of other dynamics within Sudan that are blocking recovery from decades of war between the North and South, that continue to marginalize and destabilize other regions, and more generally perpetuate political exclusion, economic and social underdevelopment and inequality, and human rights abuses that affect the vast majority of Sudanese, whether in the North, South, East or West.

Long-term peacebuilding in Sudan necessitates an increased Canadian diplomatic and aid presence on the ground to help ensure peace processes do not unravel and to help develop timely responses to emerging post-conflict crises.

Long-term peacebuilding also implies effective and sustained support for Sudanese civil society so that ordinary Sudanese can participate freely in the processes of political, economic, and social dialogue and decision-making that affects their lives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. Canada should substantially strengthen its diplomatic presence in Khartoum and establish a continuous diplomatic presence on the ground in South Sudan to monitor and advise on potential areas for increased partnership and capacity building that reaches people in the South seeking to rebuild their lives.

10. Canada must work for progress in helping Sudan make a successful transition from war to durable peace by taking measures to anchor the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in real, visible improvements for people, including:

- Taking a lead role in support of disarmament programs and UN monitoring of clashes and violence that violate the CPA;
- Supporting ongoing assessment of the needs of returnees and rapid impact programs in support of education, health care and housing to help meet the expectations of returnees;
- Mitigating the risks of corruption and mismanagement within the government of South Sudan by undertaking and supporting good governance and capacity building projects and training, particularly those geared to the establishment of effective bureaucratic structures and financial management, and on-going independent, objective evaluation of the effectiveness of government performance;
- Strengthening the rule of law and conflict-resolution programs to enhance the ability of communities to manage both local disputes and crime;
- Support for improved food security through increased production, diversification of crops, and development of new food sources, such as fish farming. To accomplish this, basic tools and increased agricultural training are needed.

11. That Canada use diplomatic means to ensure space for Sudanese civil society and non-governmental actors within decision-making processes, including a reworking of the guidelines for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation to make it a constructive vehicle for peace.

BACKGROUND

Protection of People

Humanitarian Access

A total of 3.5 million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. However, humanitarian agencies face a number of specific problems, including difficulties securing necessary visas and travel permits to allow staff to enter, reside, or travel within Darfur, and restrictions on the importation and use of humanitarian equipment and goods, even including the fuel necessary to run water-pumps.

According to Jan Egeland, the UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, day-to-day difficulties of operating in Darfur “are being compounded by a constant stream of threats and a climate of intimidation created by the Government...Staff have been arrested, their passports have been taken for no apparent reason, and even the largest NGOs are threatened with expulsion.”¹ Similar tactics are also used to block humanitarian assistance efforts in Eastern Sudan.

On February 20, 2006, Sudan enacted into law the *Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act, 2006* that grants discretionary and excessive regulatory power to the government over the operations of NGOs. This act limits the ability of both national and international NGOs to provide humanitarian aid.

Food aid

Although millions of displaced persons living in camps rely on food aid, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced reduced food rations in Darfur because it had received less than 50% of the funds required to sustain operations in 2006. Although current contributions have been made to ensure that the WFP will be able to provide 84% of the minimum daily energy requirement of 2,100 calories per person per

day, as opposed to the 50% rations that were distributed in May, continuity of supply issues caused by the lack of funds will persist as Sudan is heading into the hungry season. Humanitarian aid is urgently needed now. Also, because conflict has led to such a great disruption in agriculture, food aid will continue to be of the utmost importance in Darfur.

Water and sanitation

According to reports from UNICEF, 70% of the conflict-affected population in Darfur — 2.3 million people — require assistance in finding clean water sources. With water already scarce, many wells in Darfur have been contaminated by misuse or poisoned by Janjaweed militias. Cholera and other water-borne diseases are prevalent, because the only available water is being drawn from despoiled wells. Returning internally displaced persons in South Sudan also are in need of water and sanitation facilities. An outbreak of cholera has sickened over 14,000 people in South Sudan since January.

Health care within camps

Health conditions within camps are often dire, as food, health and sanitation services are not sufficient to provide for the large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). In addition to malnutrition, close living conditions and poor water quality contribute to the spread of diseases in camps, such as malaria, measles and respiratory infections, as well as water-borne diseases such as cholera and hepatitis E. These diseases are often compounded by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, particularly among victims of sexual violence.

Although access and quality of health care within camps varies greatly, those camps most affected by extreme violence tend to have the least medical care for all types of conditions. The general lack of resources and care also results in a lack of treatment for the many survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, which can have adverse life-long consequences for sexual and

¹ Jan Egeland Briefing to UNSC (20 April 2006)

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reproductive health. In turn, this affects the whole community, as the risk of infection from sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV/AIDS is a consequence of sexual violence. Given the prevalence of sexual violence in Darfur and in displacement camps, access to treatment and counseling on gender-based violence, STIs and reproductive health is urgently needed.

UN Mission in Darfur

A new UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur needs to be properly resourced, with a significant number of troops and appropriate equipment and logistical support. Only the major powers are in a position to provide these technical resources, though there are other countries that could be encouraged to provide troops. The proxy war between Chad and Sudan threatens to produce a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation and reinforces the need for a larger and more effective international security presence, particularly in West Darfur and along the border with Chad.

A UN mission needs a more robust and comprehensive mandate. A serious diplomatic effort is needed to get support from the UN Security Council for a mandate that ensures the protection of civilians and also focuses on humanitarian access, as well as includes reinforcement for the UN gender advisor's capacity to provide support for preventing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence at the operational level.

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)²

Despite some achievements, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has largely been unable to provide effective protection to most of the population of Darfur. AMIS

² AMIS has been tasked to monitor, as far as possible, the humanitarian ceasefire agreement of April 2004 and to report on violations; remain in touch with local authorities to build confidence and increase dialogue; monitor humanitarian convoys; and establish police stations in various locations to reduce attacks.

has lacked the necessary troops, equipment and resources and, more fundamentally, has operated within a very weak mandate that does not address the desperate humanitarian situation on the ground. The ceasefire between the Sudanese government and the rebels, which AMIS is supposed to be monitoring, is frequently violated. The situation has actually deteriorated in recent months, despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5. A decision was made by the AU Peace and Security Council in March 2006, to replace AMIS with a UN peacekeeping mission, although this mission may not take over until after the AU mandate ends on September 30, 2006. However, the transfer of the AU mission to the UN is being contested by the government in Khartoum, which rejects the transfer to a UN mission but has entered into dialogue with the UN. It is critical that planning for a transfer begin immediately. Lessons from the AU-UN transition in Burundi reveal that the lead time for effective transition is about six months.³

An End to Impunity

Impunity

A UN Commission of Inquiry found that both war crimes and crimes against humanity have taken place in Sudan: mass killings, including direct attacks on civilians, forced displacement, and systematic rape, among other crimes. In March 2005, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.

The authorities in Sudan have publicly refused to comply with the court's requests to arrest or surrender suspects, or to allow the court to conduct investigations in

³ The AU will need help to strengthen its numbers on the ground – from 7,000 to 12,000 – in accordance with December 2005 Joint Assessment Mission. In the immediate term, Chairperson Konaré stressed that the AU needs to strengthen its the mandate and numbers on the ground in order to monitor the implementation of the DPA.

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Darfur.⁴ Instead, they have established a national court to try war-related crimes in Darfur, despite persistent failures by the police or prosecutors to investigate these crimes. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, noted in a May 2006 report, despite the establishment of these courts, “impunity remains the norm in most cases of human rights violations in Darfur.” The current system lacks both the legal framework and trained personnel to adequately address the human rights and humanitarian law violations that have taken place throughout Sudan. The treatment of survivors of sexual violence, for example, includes a requirement that women who have been raped provide four male witnesses, making it impossible to obtain justice through the national courts.

Security forces

No judicial oversight is allowed into the conduct of Sudanese security forces. Although cases of torture have been documented and prosecution has been attempted, Article 33 of the National Security Forces Act grants immunity to the security forces, which can only be lifted by the Director of the National Security Forces.

In February 2006, the government of Sudan (National Congress Party) attempted to institute a law by presidential decree that would allow any of Sudan’s police to use live fire at their own discretion. This would extend the existing immunity of other security forces to all police by granting them immunity for the use of deadly force against civilians. Though this decree was blocked by Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) parliamentarians, in the future it will likely be debated as a bill, and demonstrates the government of Sudan’s continuing efforts to grant impunity to security forces.

⁴ Sudan has signed, but not ratified, the Rome Statute, and is bound by its signature not to undermine it. Sudan is also required under a UN Security Council resolution to cooperate fully with the Court.

Peace Processes

The Darfur Peace Agreement

While it does constitute a step towards peace in Darfur, the future of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is on very shaky ground.⁵ The DPA was not signed by two of the three main rebel groups in Darfur: the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) and SLM-al Nur, which represents the Fur tribe. This is hugely problematic because the Fur is both the largest tribe in greater Darfur and represents the majority of internally displaced persons. By failing to settle disputed land ownership, the DPA further alienates the Fur tribe, who are the main farmers in the region. Rather than ushering in peace, the lack of consensus by rebel groups has caused a rift between factions that has already led to violent in-fighting.

One of the weaknesses of the agreement is the distrust of the rebel groups of the government of Sudan. The agreement is heavily dependent on the government honouring its commitments and overseeing the disarmament of Janjaweed militias. In the past, however, they have failed to do so, ignoring both a 2004 Darfur cease-fire, and four separate 2004 agreements to disarm militias.

Further, the factions who have refused to sign the agreement argue that it does not provide adequate compensation for victims of violence and displaced persons. The agreement provides for \$30 million dollars of compensation, which, when divided among at least 2 million affected people, amounts to compensation of approximately \$15 per person.

⁵ See the weblog article by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Sudan, Jan Pronk, <<http://www.janpronk.nl/index120.html>> (June 28, 2006).

BACKGROUND

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought a formal end to the two-decade long conflict between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) of South Sudan, by increasing power-sharing between the government in Khartoum and the government of South Sudan.

Implementation of the agreement, however, has been slow and violations of the CPA by both parties are increasingly common.

Support for ongoing dialogue and cooperation between the two parties is necessary, as is pressure to fulfill the commitments of the CPA and maintain peace.

Currently, relations between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM are strained and the potential of renewed widespread conflict exists due to the NCP's rejection of the Abyei Boundaries Commission report. Abyei, has long been an area of conflict between North and South, as it is both an essential grazing area for pastoralists, as well as an oil-rich region. In the CPA, the Boundaries Commission was tasked with determining the borders of the region, and their findings were to be final and binding. However, as the boundary determined by the Commission will require the government of Sudan in the North to share oil revenues with the government of South Sudan (had the boundary been drawn further South the revenues would go solely to the government of Sudan) the NCP has rejected the report of the Commission, a clear violation of the CPA. This and the failure of talks between the NCP and the SPLM to resolve the issue, sets a dangerous precedent for the implementation of the peace agreement.

Eastern Sudan

In the 1990s, land disputes caused rebels in East Sudan to take up arms against the government. The Eastern Front, the amalgamation of two of East Sudan's largest rebel groups, also complains that the government of Sudan's long-standing

political, economic and ethnic marginalization of East Sudan has led to poverty and inequity in the region. The humanitarian situation in East Sudan is dire, with reports citing an acute malnutrition rate of about 19%, above the emergency rate of 15%.

Talks to resolve the fighting in East Sudan began June 13 in Asmara, Eritrea, with the government of Eritrea acting as mediator. However, in the lead-up to the talks, the focus of the Sudanese government has not been on resolution of the conflict in the East, rather on improving relations with Eritrea and reopening the border between the two countries. It is important that these peace negotiations not become merely an exercise in reconciling government interests and a public relations exercise, but that the internal conflict is properly addressed and resolved. In these negotiations, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLM can serve as a model, as both parties realize that the heart of resolving the dispute lies in ending the long-time marginalization of the region through power-sharing arrangements.

Peacebuilding

South Sudan

Despite the promise of peace brought by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, South Sudan continues to struggle to re-establish communities and livelihoods, rebuild the scant pre-existing infrastructure and develop institutions of governance and public administration after decades of war. There are reports of financial mismanagement in the government of South Sudan due to a lack of capacity, training and vital financial institutions such as banks. On top of slowing down the development and delivery of essential services, this mismanagement poses a security threat -- corruption and scandal could destabilize the government of South Sudan and the already fragile peace agreement.

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Although disarmament of some civilians is underway, as mandated by the CPA, disarming 100,000 former combatants has not begun. Some of the armed forces have not received pay in six months, leading to protests that block humanitarian assistance in the region. Contrary to the agreement, the parties to the CPA continue to support militias in some regions.

So far, much of the disarmament of civilians, particularly in Jonglei State, has been coercive and has led to hundreds of deaths. Those with weapons are seeking security guarantees, disarmament by a neutral party, simultaneous disarmament of other factions, and compensation for weapons turned in. Further, although the CPA talks about disarming all illegally armed civilians, there are no laws for civilian possession of arms. Current disarmament initiatives, then, are being done in a legal vacuum without consideration for the rights or protection needs of civilians in an area where the state barely exists. A greater UN monitoring presence is needed as well as legislation to control arms and ammunition, and the establishment of community-based mechanisms for arms control.

The return of 2-2.5 million IDPs has also revealed problems in the post-conflict South. Many have returned to find themselves without housing, education, health and other essential services, a bad choice compared to staying in camps where essential services are provided. Both the provision of immediate needs and ongoing needs assessments are required to smooth the transition for returnees. Further, after over two decades of conflict, returning IDPs and refugees from different areas lead to friction between ethnic and cultural groups, crop farmers and grazing herders, as well as between those who fled conflict and those who remained in the South, creating the need for community-based conflict resolution programs as well as good government policies. Finally, as IDPs return to rural areas and begin crop and cattle

farming, basic tools and more effective agricultural practices, and land and grazing management policies will be vital in reducing vulnerability to both famine and conflict.

Civil society

Throughout Sudan, civic public space is rare and contested. War curtailed movement, access to information and experience-sharing of people within the various regions of Sudan. The government in the North has frequently sought to silence or eliminate any opposition and has come to view many civil society organizations as brokers of Western influence out to circumvent its authority or undermine its power base. With governments in the North and South born from military factions, it is increasingly important that political space be opened and sustained for Sudanese civil society throughout the country. This includes, among others, local NGOs, women's groups, human rights defenders and journalists, all of who are important to keeping government transparent and accountable.

The Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act, 2006 grants discretionary and excessive regulatory power to the government over the operations of international and national NGOs. This act jeopardizes the work of Sudanese NGOs and human rights defenders, both of whom are essential actors in the promotion and implementation of any peace-processes and in the re-emerging of an active and free civil society in Sudan.

Although in recent years Sudan has relaxed its control over the press, the country still lacks a completely free press and vibrant civil society. A well-functioning democracy can be promoted in Sudan, in part, by helping secure space for and empowerment of a free press and grassroots social movements.

BACKGROUND

The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC)

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) outlines the general principles, sequencing and timelines for implementation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), intended to discuss the DPA with all stakeholders. The DDDC is an opportunity to build linkages between the peace agreement and the social, economic, cultural, and political realities of broader Darfuri society. By bringing the DPA to all stakeholders, the DDDC is meant to address the lack of representation of the broader Darfuri society in the peace process, and provide the parties to negotiations, both the rebel movements and the government of Sudan, with a platform from which both can engage in peaceful political processes.

There are major flaws within the plans for the dialogue as outlined in the peace agreement, however. The agreement stipulates that the DDDC will not be allowed to discuss security issues, and that only those parties who have signed the peace agreement (currently Sudan Liberation Movement-Minawi faction and the government of Sudan), will be allowed to address political issues. As the discussions are only advisory and the purpose is to support the DPA, there is also a distinct danger that the parties who have objections to the peace agreement will not be heard.

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Signatories:

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* CASTS endorses this brief with the reservation that if the UN Security Council fails in a subsequent resolution to invoke Chapter VII and send a multinational force with the robust mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian workers in Darfur, then Canada must take the lead in coalescing and energizing a coalition of countries together with the AU to accomplish this objective.

SIGNATORIES

Canadians Against Slavery and Torture in Sudan (CASTS) is a coalition of 19 organizations and hundreds of activists across the country advocating and lobbying on behalf of Sudanese of African descent who have suffered oppression, slavery and genocide at the hands of the Khartoum regime. CASTS was a facilitator of a larger coalition of diverse groups called Canadians for Action in Darfur and one of the founding members of the Save Darfur Coalition out of Washington.

The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC), is a network of Canadian non-governmental organizations and institutions, academics and other individuals from a wide range of sectors, including humanitarian assistance, development, conflict resolution, women's rights, peace, faith communities, peace operations, and human rights. CPCC has been working since 1994 to formulate policy and operational directions for Canadian NGOs involved in peacebuilding, in collaboration with other relevant actors. Members of the CPCC network and its Conflict Prevention, Children and Armed Conflict, Gender and Peacebuilding, Peace Operations, and Small Arms Working Groups are actively engaged in programming on Sudan.
<http://www.peacebuild.ca/>

Freedom Quest International (FQI) is an advocacy and human rights organization mandated to address the man-made causes of suffering. FQI has a geographic focus on East Africa – particularly the ongoing genocides in Sudan, and a sectoral focus on transnational corporate social responsibility. FQI has sought primarily to end the complicity of Canadian commercial activities (especially oil development) in the contested areas of Sudan.

Inter Pares is a feminist social justice organization based in Ottawa. In Sudan, Inter Pares supports the Gender Center for Research and Training in its work defending

the rights of women and promoting women's political participation in the search for peace and national reconciliation.
www.interpares.ca

KAIROS works with the Sudanese churches through both the New Sudan Council of Churches and the Sudan Council of Churches on peacebuilding and women's empowerment projects throughout Southern Sudan and Darfur. KAIROS also works with Sudanese human rights groups, training local officials in Southern Sudan. The Canadian churches, members of KAIROS, have worked for peace in Sudan for over 20 years. www.kairoscanada.org

The Primate's World Relief and Development Fund (PWRDF) is the Canadian Anglican agency for development, relief, refugees, and justice. In Sudan, PWRDF works with two councils of churches. In the North, the Sudan Council of Churches provides rehabilitation and emergency services for southern populations displaced in the North. The New Sudan Council of Churches in the South provides support for peace initiatives in ecumenical peace centres. PWRDF responds to emergency relief work in Sudan through ACT (Action by Churches Together) International, a global alliance of churches and related agencies. www.pwrdf.org

Project Ploughshares is an ecumenical peace centre of the Canadian Council of Churches. Currently it is working with the Africa Peace Forum, based in Nairobi, on policy development projects in Sudan, and more broadly in the Horn of Africa, on security aspects of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan, the control of small arms and light weapons, and building a sub-regional security architecture through IGAD. www.ploughshares.ca

The Subsahara Centre is engaged in Sudan in conflict analysis, political analysis,

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conflict management, security sector reform and Federal Governance.

www.subsaharacentre.ca

World Federalist Movement - Canada is the Canadian section of an international NGO, the World Federalist Movement. WFM - Canada facilitates networking and advocacy around application of the "Responsibility to Protect," and also coordinates a working group of Canadian NGOs advocating more effective international (UN and regional) peace operations. WFM's international secretariat is administering agency for the global Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). The CICC is actively engaged in follow up pursuant to the UN Security Council's reference to the ICC regarding possible crimes in Sudan.

www.worldfederalistscanada.org