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Update on ‘Peace’ in Sudan: One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back
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Background |
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Like the conflict in the southern part of the country, the more recent struggle has taken on racial and socio-cultural overtones, threatening to shatter a historic if fragile pattern of co-existence between Arab northerners living around Khartoum and Afro-Sudanese spread throughout the South and West of the country. Whereas the earlier conflict pitted Christian and other religious Black Sudanese against the mostly Arab and Islamic government of the country, the conflict in Darfur is largely being fought between Muslims, both African and Arab.
The conflict in Darfur sets the GoS and allied militias, the Janjaweed, against an insurgency composed of two groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). From the outset, the rebel groups were chiefly composed of three ethnic groups, Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit. However, over the last few months, under increasing attack by the Janjaweed, members of some smaller groups such as the Jebel and Dorok peoples have joined the rebellion.
After years of repression from Khartoum, western groups launched
a surprise attack in April 2003 on El Fashir, the capital of North
Darfur, damaging government aircraft and helicopters and looting
fuel and arms depots. This was followed by another major attack
on Mellit, the second largest town in North Darfur, where SLA rebels
again looted government stocks of food and arms. In May 2003, the
Sudanese government dismissed the governors of North and West Darfur
and other key officials and increased its military presence in Darfur.
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Recent developments |
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The conflict escalated in July 2003, with fighting concentrated
in North Darfur. The government launched offensives against the
SLA in Um Barou, Tine, and Karnoi, North Darfur, in response to
the SLA attacks on El Fasher, Mellit, Kutum, and Tine (the latter
on the border with Chad and an important trade route to Libya).
Government response consisted of heavy bombing by Russian-built
Antonov aircraft plus ground offensives of government troops using
heavy equipment including tanks. As its people starve, since 1999
the Sudanese government’s supply of weapons has improved considerably
as the country began to export its oil – with the help of
foreign companies like Talisman
Energy, a Calgary-based company – and these arms have
become available for deployment in the West recently with the onset
of the peace talks with southern-based rebels.
The communities fleeing the violence in Darfur believe that the
real motivation for attacks is the “Arabizing” thrust
of successive Sudanese governments. Although the conflict is complicated,
many Black Sudanese are beginning to feel like second-class citizens
and unwelcome in their own country. The bombing raids in North Darfur
have prompted thousands of civilians to flee the area for Chad,
which is now host to over 100,000 Sudanese refugees.
Civilian as well as military authorities in the current government
are said to consider the Darfur rebellion as a “regime threat”.
The Darfur rebels pose a far greater menace to their hold on office
than the SPLA rebellion in the South ever did, according to officials.
The JEM, the SLA, and the prospect of a united Darfurian coalition
that could garner support among other tribes in the West is deeply
worrying to the authorities in Khartoum, given that these groups
are Muslim, and thus not as easily objectified or inveighed against
as the southern “infidels”. In response, the government
has taken to cleansing the land of people it doesn’t want.
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The human impact |
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A U.N. High Commissioner’s Mission report, obtained by the news agency Reuters, highlights the following acts as contributing to creating a reign of terror:
| A) | Repeated attacks on civilians by Government of Sudan military and its proxy militia forces with a view to people’s displacement; |
| B) | The use of systematic and indiscriminate aerial bombardments and ground attacks on unarmed civilians; |
| C) | The use of disproportionate force by the Government of Sudan and Janjaweed forces; |
| D) | The Janjaweed operating with total impunity and in close coordination with the forces of the Government of Sudan; |
| E) | Attacks which appear to have been ethnically based, and; |
| F) | A pattern of attacks on civilians including killing, rape, pillage, arson, and torture, intent on forcing the population to disperse. |
The result for Darfur has been 1000 deaths per week, largely of civilians, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people such that the United Nations estimates that more than one million of the six million inhabitants of the region have been directly affected by the violence. Jan Egeland, the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, called the humanitarian situation in Darfur “one of the worst in the world” charging the GoS with “ethnic cleansing” of the region. In its attempt to hide the evidence of their crimes, the GoS has forced UN agencies and aid groups to suspend operations in the region, according to Mr. Egeland.
Any pretense at negotiating a ceasefire is gone, and talks scheduled in the Chadian capital of N’djamena collapsed without any serious dialogue. Sudanese president Omar El Bashir has continuously vowed to annihilate any rebellion and in mid-January 2004 the government launched a major offensive against rebel-held areas in North Darfur. The government remains convinced of a military solution to the conflict.
Attacks by Janjaweed militia on villages and towns in West Darfur have increased in recent weeks, causing new waves of displaced persons to flee their villages, flooding villages and camps in eastern Chad. Meanwhile, the international community, including Canada, has remained largely silent on the problem of Darfur, remaining content with light verbal rebuke of the Sudanese authorities at the UN, and a general lack of response in Ottawa.
Recently, the world lamented the ten-year anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda: many Canadians are still tormented by the international communities lack of response to halt the slaughter. In Sudan, we must not repeat the problems of the past, standing idly by and letting another human rights and humanitarian disaster happen without doing all that we can to try and prevent it. If we do, in ten years, how will we be judged?
For more information contact John Lewis, Program Coordinator, International
Human Rights,
jlewis
or 416 463 5312 ext. 224.
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