![]() |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Contents 1. Introduction This framework statement is to guide KAIROS in its work to promote a peace that is just and sustainable for all the peoples of Sudan; for Sudanese of all cultures and all religions–Christianity, Islam, and traditional African. KAIROS welcomes dialogue on its work and also on this statement. KAIROS’ predecessor organizations and member church bodies have long sought to encourage the government of Canada to play an active and constructive role in the search for a just and sustainable peace in Sudan. KAIROS will continue to do so. In the region, KAIROS will work through relevant church bodies, in particular the Sudan Council of Churches and New Sudan Council of Churches.
3. Background to the Conflict in Sudan The war in Sudan is Africa’s longest running civil conflict and has endured for most of the country’s 46 years of independence. Since the latest phase began in 1983, more than two million people, mostly civilians, have died. Another 4.5 million have been displaced2. The war has also been enormously costly to the international community with billions spent on humanitarian aid, and has been a source of regional political and economic instability. A military victory by any warring party is unlikely. Of the utmost urgency is a just and sustainable peace agreement. In July 2002, peace talks under the auspices of the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) resumed after a lengthy hiatus. Unprecedented vigour was injected into the peace process by the intensified focus of IGAD member states and pressure applied by the United States and other Western countries. A framework document to guide negotiations, called the Machakos Protocol, was signed in July 2002 and is regarded by many, including KAIROS partners in Sudan, as representing the best opportunity for peace in years. The signing of agreements for a cessation of hostilities for the duration of the talks (October 2002) and for unrestricted international humanitarian access to all parts of Sudan (October 2002) has reinforced these hopes. Sudan’s conflict defies facile description. While a regional north-south dimension continues to be a distinguishing feature, pitting Arab Muslims in the north against African traditional believers and Christians in the south, the conflict has grown in complexity. In 1991, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) split along ethnic lines with some of the breakaway factions aligning themselves with the government. In the mid 1990s, a number of Arab Muslim groups in the north also took up arms against the central government in Khartoum. Some of these groups have allied themselves to the SPLA, which maintains a fighting presence in the north as well as the south. There are war fronts not only in southern but also south central3 and eastern Sudan. Issues of human rights and human security have featured prominently in Sudan’s conflict. Civil and political rights have been systematically abused in areas under government authority where rule by decree is standard governance procedure. The Right to Development of northern and southern Sudanese alike has been violated through the prolonged prosecution of the war and through the government's use of oil revenues to purchase weaponry while ignoring chronic needs in areas of social and infrastructure development. Conflict over resources, in particular oil, have exacerbated conflict in Sudan and contributed to gross human rights abuses. All parties have committed human rights violations against civilians and violations of humanitarian law. The government, however, is responsible for ongoing massive abuses that several reputable international agencies and KAIROS’ Sudanese partners say conform to internationally accepted definitions of genocide, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 9 December 1948).4 Included in those abuses are aerial bombardment, scorched earth practices in which hundreds of villages have been razed, the systematic de-population of large areas, the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, slavery, the systematic denial of food aid, and the inculcation of non-Arab and non-Muslim Sudanese with Arab culture and a version of Islam.5 Moreover, while both sides have illegally used international aid as a weapon of war, the government has co-opted aid as part of an economic strategy for the development of Sudan that is closely linked with its war objectives. Since 1993 the UN Commission on Human Rights has scrutinized and condemned Sudan’s human rights record and made the country subject to special procedures, namely the mechanism of a special rapporteur. KAIROS has been a partner of the Sudan and New Sudan Councils of
Churches for more than a decade. The World Council of Churches’
Sudan Ecumenical Forum of which KAIROS is a member coordinates international
church-based research and advocacy on Sudan. KAIROS aims to promote
a solution to the conflict that will result in a just and sustainable
peace in Sudan and self-determination for all Sudan’s marginalized
peoples. 4. Principles Upon Which This Policy is Based 4.1. The causes of Sudan's civil conflict are rooted in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history and must be addressed if a just and sustainable peace is to be achieved.6 4.2. Civil war has been waged for most of the Sudan’s 46 years as an independent state, fueled not only by historical factors but also the controversial policies of successive central governments in Khartoum.7 4.3. The conflict in Sudan has been an enduring source of regional political and economic instability.8 4.4. All parties to the conflict have committed human rights violations against civilians but of significantly different proportions.9 4.5. Religious liberty and the promotion by and among Sudanese of tolerance and respect for each other’s faith traditions are essential if peace is to be sustainable. 4.6. The conflict has produced human rights violations on a massive scale making human rights monitoring and safeguards essential during the ceasefire period and following the signing of any peace agreement. 4.7. The humanitarian catastrophes that have affected millions and killed hundreds of thousands of Sudanese in the last decade have been either caused by or are related to the civil war.10 4.8. Foreign aided oil exploitation and development is a contributing cause of the current conflict, has led to an escalation in the civil war and is associated with massive human rights abuses.11 4.9. All attacks on civilians whether in pursuit of political, military, economic or others objectives are in violation of international human rights and humanitarian law.12 4.10. The IGAD peace process for Sudan represents the best opportunity for a just and lasting political settlement.13 4.11. Civil society input into the peace process is essential if a truly just and sustainable peace is to be achieved.14 4.12. A just and sustainable peace requires that the right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan, and the people of Abyei, the Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile, be recognized and exercised.15 4.13. Efforts toward reconciliation – among southerners, among northerners and between southerners and northerners – are essential regardless of the outcome of the exercise of the right of self-determination for southern Sudanese and others. 5.1. The regional IGAD peace process for Sudan represents the best option for securing a just and sustainable peace. The Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement should take the process seriously and negotiate in good faith. 5.2. The basis for a resolution of the conflict must be the IGAD Declaration of Principles and Machakos Protocol, the complementary negotiation frameworks which make provision for the right of self-determination and secular governance for southern Sudanese, two critical issues whose resolution is necessary to achieve a meaningful peace. KAIROS notes that the Machakos Protocol also makes provision for agreements on the north-south border, power and wealth sharing between northern and southern Sudan, and governance and security arrangements during the proposed six-year period of transition. 5.3. A just and sustainable resolution of the conflict requires that the right of self-determination for southern Sudanese, and other marginalized peoples in Sudan, be recognized and exercised. 5.4. A just and sustainable resolution of the conflict requires the inclusion in any constitution of principles of religious liberty and the promotion by and among Sudanese of tolerance and respect for each other’s faith traditions. 5.5. A just and sustainable resolution of the conflict requires that Sudanese civil society organizations that are committed to building a democratic and pluralistic society have meaningful input into the peace negotiations. The Government of Canada should support civil society access to the peace process through the office of Canada’s special envoy to the Sudan peace process and other appropriate channels. 5.6. All parties to the conflict should respect the agreement they signed in October 2002 to cease all hostilities while peace talks are taking place. 5.7. All parties to the conflict must cease attacking civilians and respect their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law. 5.8. All parties to the conflict must respect the agreement they signed in October 2002 to allow unrestricted international humanitarian access to all parts of Sudan. They must also respect the terms of the tripartite agreement that created, in 1989, the United Nations humanitarian relief program Operation Lifeline Sudan. This includes unrestricted aid to the Nuba Mountains. 5.9. All aspects of oil exploitation and development should be suspended until a just and sustainable peace is achieved. This position should be advocated to any oil company with activities in Sudan and the governments of the countries in which the oil companies are based. 5.10. All parties to the conflict should allow human rights field monitoring in all areas of conflict, including the oil concession areas, by indigenous (Sudanese) monitors, monitors appointed by foreign governments and/or the United Nations, and independent international monitors deployed by NGOs. 5.11. Foreign donor governments, including Canada, should be planning now as to how they can best support the hoped for peace agreement with various forms of assistance including additional humanitarian aid, development aid (including assistance for building democratic institutions based on good governance and respect for human rights), support for reconciliation initiatives, and human rights field monitoring. 5.12. Canada should develop new, effective regulatory measures that would prevent a repeat performance of the Talisman Energy experience. All Canadian companies operating in zones of conflict should be required to comply with standards based on international human rights and humanitarian law. Early adoption of such legislation would reflect the fact that an overwhelming majority of Canadians do not want corporations to be complicit in wars that harm civilians in other countries.
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||